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Courting Disorder: Some Thoughts on  
Community Courts 
Anthony C. Thompson* 
INTRODUCTION 
Specialized “community courts”1 have burst onto the judicial 
landscape almost overnight. To many, these courts seem a logical 
extension of the drug courts that proliferated in the 1980s. Drug 
courts successfully departed from traditional court operations by 
narrowing their focus to the treatment of drug problems and the 
criminal conduct that tends to flow from addiction. Such specialized 
concentration both targeted the defendant’s problems and allowed 
professionals working in the system to develop a level of expertise 
that attends such focused work. But the community courts that have 
recently emerged are a different breed. These courts have a wide 
focus—perhaps too wide. They seek to address complex issues 
ranging from domestic violence to mental health. In the process, 
community courts have begun to utilize the coercive power of the 
judiciary in ways that raise questions about their propriety and 
necessity. Interestingly, these concerns have not surfaced in the 
literature examining community courts. Whereas drug courts have 
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Clinical Education Program for inviting me to be the 2002 Martin Luther King Commemorative 
Speaker. I would like to thank Professors Randy Hertz, Jerry Lopez and especially Kim Taylor-
Thompson for their comments on early drafts of this Article. I would also like to thank Kate 
Sawyer for her invaluable research assistance and Dulcie Ingleton for her administrative 
support. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Filomen D’ Agostino and Max 
Greenberg Research Fund at the New York University School of Law. This Article was 
prepared as part of Washington University School of Law’s 2001-2002 Public Interest Law 
Speaker Series. 
 1. Community courts and problem-solving courts are terms used interchangeably. See, 
e.g., infra note 3. 
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been analyzed and evaluated from a variety of perspectives,2 a review 
of the articles addressing community courts reveals a particular slant: 
They tend to be written by drug court judges, administrators or 
designers, and thus are usually highly laudatory.3 In evaluating 
whether community courts should become a permanent part of the 
judicial landscape, more is needed than partisan articles that sing 
these courts’ virtues. 
What accounts for the broad receptivity to community courts? 
One likely explanation relates to the success of drug courts. In 
response to the failure of traditional courts to address the individual 
circumstances of each offender’s life, drug courts have pursued a 
mission of meaningful intervention that, out of necessity, requires 
processes different from the familiar path of a criminal case. By 
utilizing multi-disciplinary approaches in their handling of individual 
cases and by integrating social services, health, and drug treatment 
with what has traditionally been the role of probation, drug courts are 
able to address the root causes of an individual’s involvement in the 
criminal justice system. Drug courts have all but abandoned 
conventional adversarial roles in the interest of providing a more 
therapeutic and less contentious environment for the resolution of 
issues. Judges assigned to drug courts closely monitor offenders 
through a process of treatment and recovery.4 The bounded adversary 
 
 2. See, e.g., John Feinblatt et al., Institutionalizing Innovation: The New York Drug 
Court Story, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 277 (2000); Jefferson M. Fish, Is Our Drug Policy 
Effective? Are There Alternatives?, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 9 (2000); Alan I. Leshner, 
Treatment Option for Drug Offenders is Consistent with Research Findings, 72 N.Y. ST. B.J. 
53 (2000); Note, Alternatives to Incarceration for Drug Abusing Offenders, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
1898 (1998); Susan Weinstein, Ethical Considerations for Prosecutors in Drug Courts, 15 
CRIM. JUST. 26 (2000).  
 3. See Greg Berman & Susan K. Knipps, New York’s Problem-Solving Courts Provide 
Meaningful Alternatives to Traditional Remedies, 72 N.Y. ST. B.J. 8 (2000); Alex Calabrese, 
“Team Red Hook” Addresses Wide Range of Community Needs, 72 N.Y. ST. B.J. 14 (2000); 
Derek A. Denckla, Forgiveness as a Problem Solving Tool in the Courts: A Brief Response to 
the Panel on Forgiveness in Criminal Law, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1613 (2000); Judith S. 
Kaye, Rethinking Traditional Approaches, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1491, 1494 (1999) [hereinafter 
Kaye, Rethinking]; Judith S. Kaye & Susan K. Knipps, Judicial Responses to Domestic 
Violence: The Case for a Problem Solving Approach, 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 11 (1999-2000). 
 4. See Margaret P. Spencer, Sentencing Drug Offenders: The Incarceration Addiction, 
40 VILL. L. REV. 335, 377 (1995) (citing U.S. Department of Justice: An Analysis of Non-
Violent Drug Offenders with Minimal Criminal Histories, Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 54, at 2117 
(Feb. 16, 1994)). 
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system that is a seemingly indispensable part of the traditional court 
process appears out of place in this new context. With their radical 
innovations, drug courts have seen and documented changes in the 
conduct of many offenders.5 
Despite their reported successes, drug courts have met with 
criticism. Some observers have expressed concern that the courts’ 
expansion beyond the traditional public safety role has been short-
sighted.6 They caution that the proliferation of drug courts and the 
attendant elimination of the adversarial process have occurred in an 
absence of rigorous analysis of either the appropriateness or the long 
term effectiveness of such courts. What should raise concern is that 
few observers and scholars have fully explored the increased 
importance of judicial discretion in these new, non-adversarial courts. 
In spite of these criticisms—and almost oblivious to them—drug 
courts have developed at a rapid pace.7 
Riding the favorable tide created by drug courts, community 
courts have emerged as the latest judicial innovation. Despite their 
diverse substantive focuses, these new courts share some common 
features. First, like their drug court antecedents, community courts 
seek to broaden the deterrent and retributive aims of conventional 
legal proceedings by providing offenders with particularized 
services.8 While drug courts offer drug treatment to offenders, 
community courts either mandate or provide access to job training, 
health care, and other social services.9 The courts routinely have at 
least one component that allows interaction between sectors of the 
community and the court. The form of community participation 
ranges from presence on advisory boards and impact panels to 
occasional opportunities to voice concerns through town hall 
meetings.10 
The drive to find some way to make courts more responsive to 
community interests has led to community courts. These courts were 
 
 5. See sources cited infra note 61. 
 6. Roscoe Pound, The Administration of Justice in the Modern City, 26 HARV. L. REV. 
302, 308 (1913).  
 7. See Goldkamp, infra note 22, at 923. 
 8. Feinblatt et al., supra note 2, at 282. 
 9. Berman & Knipps, supra note 3, at 8. 
 10. Id. at 9. 
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established as part of a larger and growing community justice 
movement.11 The underlying premise of community courts is that 
those communities most often affected by the sentencing process are 
least likely to be consulted about or involved in the resolution of 
court cases.12 A community-oriented adjudication model, at least in 
theory, seeks to give greater voice to communities in the exercise and 
implementation of justice. Premised in large part on the philosophy 
developed in the ground-breaking article Broken Windows,13 
community courts have been promoted as both a way to enable 
communities to maintain control over their neighborhoods and a 
mechanism to imbue the judicial system with a degree of legitimacy 
that it had recently lost.14  
The push for community courts emerged in part from the 
community-oriented problem-solving policing experience.15 The 
Broken Windows thesis that launched the community-policing trend 
maintains that local authorities’ lack of attention to low income 
communities is linked to an increase in criminal activity in those 
neighborhoods.16 Thus, exercising greater “controls” over a 
community would lessen criminal conduct.17 These specialized 
community courts are thus designed to permit the community—and 
the court—to regain authority over conduct that threatens the 
 
 11. See, e.g., Todd R. Clear & David R. Karp, The Community Justice Movement, in 
COMMUNITY JUSTICE: AN EMERGING FIELD 9 (David R. Karp ed., 1998). 
 12. See id. 
 13. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and 
Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29. 
 14. See, e.g., Bill Rankin, Whites More Apt to Get Probation, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 
8, 1998, at 1A (citing the state Racial and Ethnic Bias Commission,” which found far-reaching 
distrust among minorities of the state’s legal system”); Lori Montgomery, One in Three Young 
Black Men Jailed, Paroled or on Probation, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 5, 1995, at A7 (stating that 
disproportionate rate of arrest “[f]osters a deep distrust of the white-dominated legal system that 
appears to have marked them as targets”).  
 15. See David Rottman & Pamela Casey, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Emergence 
of Problem-Solving Courts, 240 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 12, 15 (July 1999), available at 
http://www.nesc.dni.us/RESEARCH/rottman.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2002); Janet Reno, 
Remarks to the American Association of University Women (June 19, 1999), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/1999/agwomenspeech.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2002) 
(“We have funded and encouraged new community strategies—community policing, innovative 
crime prevention programs, community courts.”). 
 16. See supra note 13. 
 17. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 13, at 29. 
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community’s safety and economic viability. But close examination of 
the courts’ practical operation reveals a different outcome. In effect, 
the judicial system has assumed authority over conduct that had 
previously been considered beyond its mandate by focusing its 
attention and attendant coercive power on minor or victimless 
crimes.18  
Gaps between theoretical objectives and actual operation are 
perhaps to be expected. Close examination of the actual practices of 
an institution often reveal tensions related to objectives and identity 
that might otherwise escape notice. To help sort through these issues, 
this Article will use empirical and anecdotal data as well as existing 
literature on community courts to evaluate the effectiveness of these 
courts in achieving their stated objectives. In so doing, this Article 
does not purport to evaluate all types of community courts. Nor will 
it attempt to provide an in-depth analysis of all the issues that 
surround the history, establishment, design, and operation of 
community courts. Rather, this Article will identify certain 
representative problems that inevitably occur in these courts and will 
examine the extent to which the conflicts inherent in their operation 
prevent these courts from achieving their aims.  
Part I briefly examines the history of drug courts and explores 
questions about their management and operation. Part II traces the 
progression from drug courts to the broader notion of community 
courts and questions the assumption that the methodology used in 
drug courts should be employed in other types of courts. Part III sets 
out an appropriate research agenda for determining whether 
community courts should continue to flourish.  
I. DRUG COURTS: AN INNOVATIVE RESPONSE TO SKY-ROCKETING 
CASELOADS 
The 1980s witnessed a marked increase in arrests and convictions 
for drug-related crimes. The War on Drugs19 exerted dramatic 
 
 18. Contra Bill Campbell, Mayor Says the City’s Rebirth is Owed to Holistic Approach, 
ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 1, 1999, at 3JD (stating that the mayor of Atlanta supports 
“enforcing all the city laws, because there are no victimless crimes”).  
 19. See http://www.drugwarfacts.org (last visited Apr. 30, 2002).  
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pressures on all facets of the criminal justice system. Between 1980 
and 1998 the number of arrests nationwide increased forty percent.20 
Arrests for drug possession, possession for sale of controlled 
substances, and sales of drugs increased 168%.21 Many of the 
defendants facing drug charges in criminal court were repeat drug 
offenders.22 Crack cocaine coupled with the re-emergence of a strong 
strain of black tar heroin and other new drugs made issues leading to 
criminal conduct much more difficult for the courts to resolve. At the 
same time, state and federal law enforcement received massive 
budget increases and formed an array of special drug units that 
increased the number of street-level arrests.23 
A crisis was in the making. Courts, already overwhelmed by 
caseload increases as a result of other criminal justice initiatives,24 
could do little more than process cases. Defendants placed on 
probation often returned to court facing a violation of probation as a 
result of reverting to drug use or committing crimes to support their 
habits. Still others served their time only to be released with little 
programmatic support to prevent their return to drugs and the 
attention of the judicial system. The rates of recidivism offered 
glaring proof that the conventional approaches to criminal cases had 
little effect on the problems underlying drug-related crimes. The 
system consequently lost some of its legitimacy as the public 
increasingly perceived it to be no more than a revolving door.25 Drug 
courts thus emerged as the judicial system’s answer to both its own 
 
 20. See Steven Belenko, The Challenges of Integrating Drug Treatment into the Criminal 
Justice System, 63 ALB. L. REV. 833, 834 (2000). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See John S. Goldkamp, The Drug Court Response: Issues and Implications for Justice 
Change, 63 ALB. L. REV. 923 (2000).  
 23. See Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment 
Court Movement: Revolutionalizing the Criminal Justice System’s Response to Drug Abuse and 
Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 454-59 (1999); see also Joan Petersilia, 
Probation and Parole, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 563, 579 (Michael 
Tonry ed., 1998) (distinguishing jurisdictions whose resources and historical commitment to 
rehabilitation have enabled them to “refer” individuals to existing community social service 
programs from those whose overall services are woefully inadequate to meet their community’s 
needs).  
 24. Id. 
 25. United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 682 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-
190, at 6 (1984)).  
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sense of ineffectiveness and the growing number of complaints that 
the court system needed to address the root causes of criminal 
behavior. 
A. The Evolution of the Drug Court Model 
1. The History and Rationale for Drug Courts 
Despite the risk of arrest and mandatory imprisonment during the 
War on Drugs, drug trafficking flourished in the 1980s and 1990s.26 
Drug sales offered financial rewards to individuals residing in 
economically disadvantaged neighborhoods that far outweighed 
alternatives available in the legitimate economy.27 To combat drug 
usage and distribution, law enforcement stepped up its efforts by 
initiating large scale drug sweeps, deploying greater numbers of 
officers to open air drug markets, and conducting massive arrests.28 
Courtrooms around the country were inundated with defendants, 
including both first-time offenders and recidivists.29 One judge 
termed the War on Drugs “the greatest pressure on our court 
system.”30 Between 1979 and 1988, “[s]tate and local arrests for drug 
offenses (sale, manufacture, possession) doubled, and federal arrests 
more than doubled.”31 The immense caseloads flowing from this 
interdiction effort had the consequence of warping the quality of 
justice dispensed in non-drug cases, as time and money were 
 
 26. See JOINT COMM. ON N.Y. DRUG LAW EVALUATION, THE ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE 
CITY OF N.Y., THE NATION’S TOUGHEST DRUG LAW: EVALUATING THE NEW YORK 
EXPERIENCE (1977). For current nonpartisan research, see JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., 
MANDATORY MINIMUM DRUG SENTENCES: THROWING AWAY THE KEY OR THE TAXPAYERS? 
(1997); MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 24, 151 (1996); and Michael W. Sheetz, 
Comment, Cyberpredators: Police Internet Investigations Under Florida Statute, 54 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 405, 429 (2000). 
 27. Alfred Blumstein, Prisons, in CRIME 47 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1994).  
 28. See Doug Bandow, War on Drugs or War on America, 3 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 242, 
242 (1991). 
 29. See NAT’L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING FOR ANSWERS: ANNUAL EVALUATION 
REPORT ON DRUGS AND CRIME: 1992 53-56 (1993) [hereinafter SEARCHING FOR ANSWERS]. 
 30. See Mary Wisniewski, Judicial Panel Opposes Crime Bill Provision, CHI. DAILY L. 
BULL., July 16, 1991, at 1.  
 31. Candace McCoy, From Sociological Trends of 1992 to the Criminal Courts of 2020, 
66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1967, 1981 (1993). 
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disproportionately expended in drug cases.32  
The first innovative response to the unprecedented spike in drug 
cases took place in Dade County, Florida. Dade County began to 
experiment with a drug court focusing on intensive treatment for drug 
addicted defendants.33 One prosecutor called the development of the 
drug court an “admission that chemically addicted defendants were 
stretching the criminal justice system to its very limits.”34 Dade 
County, under the leadership of then State Attorney, Janet Reno, and 
then State Court Director of the Office of Substance and Abuse 
Control, Timothy Murray,35 created an entirely separate court 
structure that allowed the judiciary to approach the criminal conduct 
as a symptom of the root problem: substance abuse.36 
The Dade County initiative proved popular. Jurisdictions from 
virtually every region of the country soon followed Dade County’s 
lead by experimenting with some form of drug court. In 1994, 
Congress became involved by authorizing the Attorney General to 
make grants and loans to state, local, and Indian Tribal governments 
to establish drug courts.37 Federal government involvement led to the 
establishment of the Drug Court Program Office.38 In addition to 
creating oversight capacities, the federal government made funds 
available, which in turn prompted greater numbers of jurisdictions to 
attempt to create some form of drug court. Today, observers suggest 
that there are in excess of 425 drug courts either in operation or in the 
planning stage.39 Although jurisdictions continue to develop courts 
using the label, “drug court,” these specialized courts are far from 
identical. 
 
 32. See id. at 1986. 
 33. See Barry Klein, Treatment Is Often the Sentence in Dade’s ‘Drug Court’, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 6, 1989, at 1A. 
 34. See Claire McCaskill, COMBAT Drug Court: An Innovative Approach to Dealing 
With Drug Abusing First Time Offenders, 66 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 493, 495 (1998) 
(Claire McCaskill was first elected Jackson County (MO) prosecutor in 1992).  
 35. See PETER FINN & ANDREA K. NEWLYN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MIAMI’S “DRUG 
COURT”: A DIFFERENT APPROACH 3 (1993). 
 36. See Goldkamp, supra note 22, at 941; see also FINN & NEWLYN, supra note 35, at 3.  
 37. See Morris Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1464 (2000). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Goldkamp, supra note 22, at 923. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol10/iss1/5
p 63 Thompson book pages.doc  12/18/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002]  Courting Disorder 71 
 
2. Design and Management of Drug Courts 
Drug courts, by definition, share certain elements. These 
components have developed as much in reaction against conventional 
court practices as in pursuit of a new model of addressing drug cases 
in the criminal justice system. An examination of drug courts across a 
wide spectrum reveals the following shared characteristics: methods 
for immediate intervention, hands-on involvement of judges who 
have the obligation to define rules of behavior for defendants and to 
articulate the goals of the process, and use of a team (rather than 
adversarial) approach.  
The differences in drug court processes occur almost immediately 
for the defendant. In a traditional criminal court, an individual 
accused of a drug charge might not appear in court until days after 
her arrest. The designers of drug courts considered the gap between 
the commission of the offense and the initiation of court proceedings 
problematic.40 It unnecessarily delayed intervention, allowing the 
offender possibly to re-offend in the interim between the arrest and 
her first court appearance.41 The gap in time also sent the wrong 
message to the accused. It signaled that the accused’s treatment in 
court was somehow divorced from the incident that led to her arrest.42 
To close that gap, drug courts intervene immediately, such that the 
accused’s appearance–even on a minor offense—often occurs 
immediately after police processing.43 The net effect is to establish 
from the start that the accused is in a court that has different 
operations and different expectations. 
Different expectations extend to the professional players as well. 
Drug courts rely on the hands-on involvement of judges. Although 
 
 40. Goldkamp, supra note 22, at 945; see also Peggy Fulton Hora & William G. Schma, 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 82 JUDICATURE 9, 10-12 (1998). 
 41. Hora & Schma, supra note 40, at 10-12.   
 42. Id; see also McCaskill, supra note 34, at 495. 
 43. See DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LOOKING AT A DECADE OF DRUG COURTS 8 (1998) (noting that drug courts 
were created in 1989 as an experiment designed to reduce recidivism and to encourage 
treatment and rehabilitation for felony drug offenders); see also JOHN S. GOLDKAMP, JUSTICE 
AND TREATMENT INNOVATION: THE DRUG COURT MOVEMENT: A WORKING PAPER OF THE 
FIRST NATIONAL DRUG CONFERENCE, DECEMBER 1993 3-4 (1994) (discussing the early drug 
courts created in the 1990s, which followed the lead of the Miami court). 
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some would question whether the judge operates only as a neutral 
arbiter in the traditional lawyer-driven process, the drug court 
setting’s effectiveness depends on her extensive involvement. She 
participates in the assessment of the defendant and the development 
of a treatment plan.44 She also monitors the defendant’s treatment by 
scheduling regular appearances during which the judge will review 
reports on the defendant’s progress.45 Much of the work of the drug 
court judge was once left to probation officers, with occasional 
review by a judge if the state alleged violation of probation 
conditions. Under the new model, the judge hears of the defendant’s 
successes as well as her lapses.46 This new role requires specialized 
training for judges to help them understand, for example, the cycles 
of drug abuse that can be expected even when an individual commits 
to a plan of abstinence. 
Perhaps the single most defining feature of drug courts is the 
collaborative approach used by otherwise adversarial players. 
Prosecutors and defense counsel engage in non-adversarial, team-
oriented roles designed to both support the judge and facilitate the 
progress of the defendant’s treatment.47 Instead of the adversarial 
contest characteristic of a traditional criminal proceeding, drug courts 
adopt an ethic of cooperation. Defense counsel, prosecutors, 
corrections personnel, and addiction treatment providers share 
considerable amounts of information about the defendant’s 
amenability to treatment and progress.48 Rather than debating factual 
scenarios or legal implications, the principal players work together to 
determine the appropriate sanctions given the defendant’s 
circumstances.49 In the end, the goal is to formulate an approach that 
 
 44. See Sally L. Satel, Observational Study of Courtroom Dynamics in Selected Drug 
Courts, 1 NAT’L DRUG COURT INST. REV. 43, 45 (1998). 
 45. Id. 
 46. James R. Brown, Note, Drug Diversion Courts: Are They Needed and Will They 
Succeed in Breaking the Cycle of Drug-Related Crime?, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 63, 85 (1997). See also Caroline S. Cooper & Joseph A. Trotter, Jr., Recent 
Developments in Drug Case Management: Re-engineering the Judicial Process, 17 JUST. SYS. 
J. 83, 94 (1994). 
 47. John S. Goldkamp, The Origin of the Treatment Drug Court in Miami, in THE EARLY 
DRUG COURTS: CASE STUDIES IN JUDICIAL INNOVATION 25 (W. Clinton Terry III ed., 1999). 
 48. See Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court 
Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1208 (1998).  
 
? 49.?Id. 
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will allow the court to redirect the defendant’s behavior successfully. 
Most drug courts effect this intervention into the defendant’s life 
in either of two ways: through deferred prosecution or post-
disposition models. The deferred prosecution model accepts 
defendants into the program who have not yet resolved the factual or 
legal issues in their case.50 In exchange for the defendant’s agreement 
to participate in the drug court process, the state holds the prosecution 
in abeyance with the agreement to dismiss the charges upon 
satisfactory completion of the process. If the defendant fails to 
complete the program successfully, the state will reinstate the charges 
and the defendant will face the full range of legal penalties. One 
example of this type of diversionary program is the COMBAT drug 
court in Kansas City, Missouri.51 This court allows defendants to 
appear before the drug court judge within hours of arrest and seeks to 
keep the defendant out of the criminal justice system.52 
The post-disposition model begins from a different premise. 
Courts that utilize this process expect defendants to enter a plea of 
guilty or to agree to set of stipulated facts.53 The courts that adopt this 
model contend that a defendant needs to accept responsibility for her 
actions before meaningful intervention can occur. Under this model 
the court suspends the sentence until the defendant completes the 
program. One example of such a program is the Drug Treatment and 
Alternative to Prison (DTAP) program in New York.54 This drug 
court operates as a residential treatment program that lasts up to 
twenty-four months.55 DTAP originally targeted non-violent 
offenders arrested for B-felony drug sales who would face mandatory 
prison sentences if convicted.56 The court later extended its target 
population to include second-time drug offenders and individuals 
charged with some other non-violent felonies.57 DTAP relies on the 
 
 50. Id. at 1256.  
 51. Id. ? 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Alexandra Marks, Governors Seek New Way to Halt Drugs, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Feb. 6, 2001, at 2. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Belenko, supra note 20, at 845-46. 
 57. Martin I. Reisig, Prisons and Corrections: Rediscovering Rehabilitation: Drug 
Courts, Community Corrections and Restorative Justice, 77 MICH. B.J. 172, 174 (1998).  
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coercive power of a suspended sentence to keep the individual 
committed to what can be a difficult period of adjustment in a 
residential treatment program.58 
Both the deferred prosecution and the post-disposition models 
have legal consequences for drug court participants. Even in the 
deferred prosecution model, where the defendant has less to lose, the 
choice may not be as simple as one might think.59 Participants may 
gain the benefit of treatment and eventual dismissal of their charges, 
but, in exchange, they must agree to a much longer involvement with 
the criminal justice system. During this period of supervision, their 
activities are scrutinized and they can expect close supervision, 
whereas in the traditional proceeding, they might have faced fewer 
controls on their behavior. In addition to this prolonged exposure to 
the court, participants in this model may be reluctant to challenge the 
legality of their detention or arrest after a lengthy participation in the 
court’s programs. In the post-disposition model, there are different 
concerns. Drug court participation is conditioned on a willingness to 
forego any legal challenges that the defendant might have raised 
regarding her arrest or the seizure of evidence. 
B. Evaluating the Successes and Failures 
Drug courts appear to be successful by a number of measures.60 
They have been directly linked to lower recidivism rates.61 “A 1998 
evaluation that compared re-arrest rates for drug court participants 
with non-participants, concluded that re-arrest rates for program 
graduates were lower.”62 Another apparent benefit is cost-efficiency. 
Drug courts have achieved net savings of $2 million in jail costs.63 
The cost of incarceration far exceeds either residential or outpatient 
 
 58. Belenko, supra note 20, at 847. 
? 59.?Boldt, supra note 48, at 1255-56. 
? 60.?See Belenko, supra note 20, at 850 (praising drug courts for leading to comparatively 
reduced drug use rates and criminal activity among participants). 
 61. See Steven Belenko, infra note 64, at 30-34 (finding that three of six studies reported 
lower recidivism for drug court clients following termination of monitoring; two studies did not 
report comparative statistics); Id. at 33 (finding that drug court participants had lower post-
program recidivism in seven of twelve studies). 
 62. See Belenko, supra note 20, at 850. 
 63. Id.? 
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treatment, and drug courts consistently save money even after 
factoring in administrative costs.64 For example, a study of the 
Multnomah County, Oregon drug court found that the court had 
saved $2.5 million in its handling of 440 cases over a two-year 
period.65 
From a human cost perspective, compared to more conventional 
courts, drug courts have helped individuals gain greater control over 
their lives and their drug addictions. Prior to the advent of drug 
courts, judges’ interactions with defendants were much more limited. 
In those instances where the offender continued to use drugs, the 
court tended to revoke probation and to incarcerate her. In contrast, 
the intense focus on drug addiction by professionals in the justice 
system and medical field through drug courts has helped increase the 
courts’ understanding of the nature of addiction. Courts have come to 
expect that an individual will relapse during the process of 
recovery.66 They have seen that measured responses such as a short 
period of incarceration followed by release back into the treatment 
regimen can produce better results than long-term incarceration.67 
The individual learns the consequences of her conduct and then is 
able to return to a path of recovery. Such depth of understanding of 
the pull of addiction was not evident among judges before the advent 
of drug courts. 
The success of drug treatment court initiatives has received wide 
attention68 and praise, and has led to expanded funding.69 In the midst 
 
? 64.?See Steven Belenko, Research on Drug Courts: A Critical Review, 1 NAT’L DRUG CT. 
INST. REV. 10, 43 (1998).  
? 65. Id. ? 
? 66.?See GERSTEIN & HARWOOD, TREATING DRUG PROBLEMS, VOL. 1, A STUDY OF THE 
EVOLUTION, EFFECTIVENESS, AND FINANCING OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DRUG TREATMENT 
SYSTEMS 73 (Dean R. Gerstein & Henrick J. Harwood eds., 1990); Weinstein, supra note 2, at 
28. Any drug treatment provider will affirm that during the recovery process relapse is almost 
always inevitable. John Marr, Recovery-Relapse Cycle, Speech Presented at the National Drug 
Court Institute’s Comprehensive Drug Court Prosecutors’ Training (Sept. 1999). Relapse is 
defined as “a breakdown or set back in a person’s attempt to change or modify behavior.” G. 
ALAN MARLATT & JUDITH R. GORDON, RELAPSE PREVENTION (1985). 
 67. See Douglas B. Marlowe, Effective Strategies for Intervening with Drug Abusing 
Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REV. 989, 1017-18. 
 
? 68.?See, e.g., Boldt, supra note 48 (surveying history of rehabilitative models and 
discussing theoretical tensions in related literature); Adele Harrell et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Evaluation of the D.C. Superior Court Drug Intervention Programs, at http://www.ojp.usdoj 
.gov/nij/courdocs2000.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2002) (reporting decrease in drug use and 
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of the praise, however, there have been some fairly bitter critiques.70 
To some, the emergence of drug courts amounts to little more than a 
nostalgic yearning for the idealism of an earlier decade that never 
really existed.71 To these critics, the drug court approach smacks of 
misdirected, soft-on-crime treatment that failed in other settings. 
Indeed, a related charge is that advocates of this model forget or 
purposefully overlook the disappointing lessons, abuses, and poor 
track record of rehabilitation policies that preceded the U.S. criminal 
justice system’s shift toward the more punitive orientation in recent 
decades.72 Of greatest concern is that under the guise of reform, drug 
courts may have distracted policy makers from focusing on the 
effects of short-sighted drug policy initiatives. By making loose 
reference to restorative justice, social justice, and rehabilitation, 
critics contend that drug court advocates may convince themselves 
that they are doing more than merely scratching the surface.  
 
criminal activity among defendants who participated in comprehensive treatment program). 
 69. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Reno Announces Funds to 
Continue Successful Drug Court Program (June 3, 1999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj 
.gov/dcpo/dcpopr63.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2002) (announcing that another $14 million was 
awarded to 147 jurisdictions to “expand, enhance or plan drug courts to treat nonviolent, 
substance-abusing offenders,” bringing total federal drug court grants since 1995 to over $100 
million). 
 70. See Hoffman, supra note 37, at 1485: 
The traditional measure of drug court success has been recidivism—that is, the rates at 
which drug court defendants, as compared to drug defendants in traditional courts, 
reoffend. The impact studies have looked at two kinds of recidivism: rearrests and 
probation violations. Rearrest recidivism is probably the more accurate of the two. 
Measuring drug court success by comparing probation violation rates undervalues the 
effect of drug courts because drug court probationers are, at least in treatment-based 
models, much more closely supervised and therefore much more likely to be detected 
violating their probation than their traditional court cohorts. Nevertheless, even relying 
on traditional rearrest rates as a measure of recidivism poses some methodological 
challenges in the drug court context. 
 71. See generally Boldt, supra note 48, at 1206-18 (discussing the various viewpoints 
toward rehabilitation therapy). “[T]he objection is that the drug treatment court movement not 
only presents difficulties for individual defendants and their attorneys, it also undermines larger 
efforts to develop an effective drug policy premised on a public health model.” Id. at 1217. 
 72. See Boldt, supra note 37, at 1219-23. ? 
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C. Unresolved Issues In Drug Court Implementation 
The competing claims for and against drug courts frame the 
debate regarding the need for specialized courts to deal with the 
problem of drug addiction. Some might argue that every courtroom 
should be equipped with the technologies developed in drug courts 
and should have access to a menu of service providers to help the 
defendant conform her behavior to the law. In making this decision, 
court administrators are faced with a basic trade-off: balancing the 
risk of watering down the effectiveness of drug courts by adopting 
identical procedures in every courtroom against the risk of limiting 
the court’s reach by keeping drug courts separate. This issue will 
become ever more important as drug courts move from 
experimentation to full implementation, and from urban centers to 
rural jurisdictions. If the answer is to give all judges in the state the 
tools they need to link defendants to treatment and monitor their 
progress, there will be a need for an infusion of resources, intensive 
training and new measures of success to ensure that the quality of the 
drug court approach is maintained. 
1. Role Differences 
As stated above, two of the defining concepts of drug courts are 
non-adversarial proceedings and teamwork involving the judge, 
prosecutor, and defender73 engaging in “non-traditional roles.”74 This 
shift from a conventional framework to one in which prosecutors and 
defense counsel assume a more collaborative posture has “altered the 
dynamics of the courtroom, including at times, traditional features of 
the adversarial process.”75 Key to accomplishing the court’s 
therapeutic goals is a deliberate choice to mute the traditional 
adversarial positions of prosecutor and defense counsel, and to 
transform the process from lawyer-driven to judge-driven. This 
inversion of the traditional adversary paradigm—which ordinarily 
 
 73. See Hora et al., supra note 23, at 453.  
 74. See John Feinblatt, Institutionalizing Innovation: The New York Drug Court Story, 28 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 277, 292 n.19 (2000) (citing Greg Berman, Problem-Solving Courts: A 
Brief Primer 1 (2000) (unpublished paper on file with author)). 
 75. Id. 
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assumes that the parties’ lawyers will play an active, partisan role 
while the judge remains passive and neutral—tends to be 
accompanied by a high degree of procedural informality. The 
emphasis on informality typically includes a movement away from 
critical analysis of the evidence in the case.76  
Court observers and participants have published a wide variety of 
materials lauding the success of problem-solving courts and 
suggesting roles for the participants.77 However, no one has offered a 
legal, ethical, or legislative basis for the change in role for the 
respective criminal justice institutional actors. The roles have simply 
changed. Judges are asked to convene community meetings or broker 
social services.78 The teamwork requires each participant to assume a 
role in monitoring the progress of defendants in either drug treatment 
programs or some other form of treatment. Each newly formulated 
role carries with it a host of ethical ramifications that drug court 
advocates either minimize or ignore.79  
Judges traditionally operate within the constraints of ethical 
guidelines that cast them in the role of neutral decision-maker.80 This 
neutrality has been an important feature of adjudication. The 
framework is familiar: two interested advocates present and debate 
factual and legal matters while a more detached figure assesses those 
arguments and reaches a decision. In theory, this detachment is 
designed to reduce the likelihood of decision making based on favor 
or bias. While such ethical protections often do not work as well in 
 
 76. See Boldt, supra note 48, at 1252. 
 77. See Goldkamp, supra note 47, at 25. 
 78. Boldt, supra note 48, at 1252. 
 79. Janet Gilbert et al., Applying Therapeutic Principles to a Family-Focused Juvenile 
Justice Model (Delinquency), 52 ALB. L. REV. 1153, 1205-06; NAT’L DRUG CT. INST., 
EXCERPTS FROM A TREATISE ON ETHICS AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN DRUG COURTS: FEDERAL 
CONFIDENTIALITY LAWS AND HOW THEY AFFECT DRUG COURT PRACTITIONERS (1999), 
available at http://www.ndci.org/admin/docs/confid.doc (last visited Apr. 1, 20002); see also 
The Drug Court Clearinghouse and Technical Assistance Project, The American Univ., 
Practical Guide for Applying Federal Confidentiality Laws to Drug Courts Operations, at 
http://www.american.edu/justice/publications/Confed.htm (last visited May 30, 2001); Caroline 
S. Cooper, Nat’l Drug Court Inst., Issues Raised for Defense Counsel in Drug Court 
Representation Relevant to the ABA Canon of Ethics: Canons 2-4 (1999) (draft), available at 
http://www.american.edu/justice/publications/ndci_ethics.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2002) 
(outline proposed best practices in light of canons of ethics). 
 80. See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS (1990). 
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practice as in theory,81 drug courts forego whatever safeguards the 
conventional construct offers by instructing judges to play a more 
active and interested role. 
Several other problems may arise with the judges’ new function. 
The form of drug court intervention seems inherently paternalistic. 
The judges are armed with only limited information. They typically 
do not have the sort of professional or specialized training that one 
would expect from someone vested with the responsibility to choose 
and design treatment programs. Instead, they function on the belief 
that they can fully understand a defendant’s problems sufficiently to 
dictate what is the best treatment. Judges may become personally 
invested in the success of a defendant’s efforts. In the event of 
failure, the judge may react personally and increase punishment 
inappropriately. In addition, there are often class and race 
implications since many who pass before drug court judges are 
people of color. Courts simply have not addressed these problems in 
a comprehensive way. Instead, they have taken a few pragmatic 
steps. For example, drug courts tend to choose judges who exhibit 
balanced temperaments and some willingness to seek further 
education in preparation for work in drug court.82 Such minor 
adjustments are no substitute for a careful examination of the 
problems drug courts face. Significant safeguards are needed. 
Of the judge, defense counsel, and the prosecutor, drug courts 
have altered the prosecutor’s role the least. Prosecutors operate with a 
dual ethical mission: to be advocates of the state and ministers of 
justice.83 Although working as part of a team that includes one’s 
adversary may not typically occur in conventional prosecutions—
except in instances where an accused is a cooperating witness in 
prosecution of another individual—the prosecutor at least has had 
occasion to play less adversarial roles. Thus, prosecutors may merely 
need to expand their roles slightly to meet the unique structure of the 
 
 81. See Steven Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid 
Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 308, 326 (1997) (“The overall quality of justice is affected when courts are composed of 
judges who are there to produce certain results.”). 
 82. See Fred Setterberg, Drug Court, CALIFORNIA LAW., May 1994, at 58, 62. 
 83. See Kenneth J. Mellili, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 B.Y.U. 
L. REV. 669, 693-96 (1992).  
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drug court.84  
Prosecutors’ participation in teamwork in many instances involves 
making a discretionary decision to divert a case from the traditional 
track in criminal court and to allow a defendant to participate in one 
of these drug courts.85 Even the monitoring process has a 
conventional counterpart: prosecutors perform similar functions when 
reviewing a defendant’s progress on probation. These minor changes 
are not without cost, however. Given the often long delays between 
the time of arrest and the point at which a defendant may fail to 
complete the program, there may be an impact on the government’s 
ability to prosecute. The case may lose some of its deterrent effect on 
the defendant. The case may never be tried because more serious 
prosecutions will take precedence over a two-year-old charge,86 or 
prosecutors may be unable to prosecute because witnesses have 
become unavailable. Still, the role remains basically unchanged in 
this new context. 
The defense counsel in drug courts, like the judge, confronts 
considerable changes from her traditional function. Traditionally, the 
defense counsel’s role has a singular focus, the zealous representation 
of her client.87 This is understood as a focused commitment to fight 
on behalf of the accused against the immense power of the state.88 
That fight includes marshalling facts and legal arguments to exclude 
evidence and working for the release of one’s client from any 
entanglement with the court system.  
The drug court places different demands on the defense counsel.89 
She works as part of a team with the government to facilitate her 
client’s involvement with structures set up by the court.90 She is no 
 
 84. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2001). 
 85. See Weinstein, supra note 2, at 27.  
 86. See Hora et al., supra note 23, at 516-20.  
 87. See supra note 84. 
 88. See, e.g., Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional Player: Alternating 
Visions of the Public Defender, 84 GEO. L.J. 2419 (1996); Charles Ogletree, Beyond 
Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239 
(1993). 
 89. Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway? Musings of a Public Defender About 
Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 37, 44 (2000). 
 
 90. See Gloria Danziger & Jeffrey A. Khun, Drug Treatment Courts: Evolution, 
Evaluation and Future, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 166, 168-69 (1999) (“[T]he concept of 
the drug court ‘team’—judge, prosecutor, defense counsel, treatment provider and corrections 
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longer singularly focused on her client and solely directed by her 
client’s wishes. Instead, her focus shifts to what is best for her 
client’s recovery. This is by no means a small shift. Defense 
attorneys initially supported drug courts because they perceived that 
their clients had few opportunities to avoid criminal convictions.91 
However, a more careful assessment of the drug court process has left 
many defense attorneys concerned that their clients may lose too 
much in the exchange, particularly in courts that permit treatment 
only at the post-disposition stage.92 In those courts, clients face the 
difficult choice of forgoing the presumption of innocence and the 
panoply of trial rights guaranteed by the Constitution in order to get 
help.93 
2. Subordinating All Issues To Treatment 
Drug courts provide a genuine opportunity for those individuals 
who wish to take advantage of their rehabilitative services. In the 
process, however, drug courts subordinate all of the issues involved 
in a defendant’s contact with the criminal justice system to treatment. 
The court ignores viable factual or legal issues regarding the 
detention or arrest of the defendant. Although treatment of the 
defendant’s drug problems may be important to her future, addressing 
law enforcement improprieties often is of equal significance. Even if 
the drug court successfully addresses the defendant’s drug problem, 
she may be left with the impression that being stopped illegally 
because of her race, ethnicity, or place of residence is unimportant to 
the criminal justice system. Subordination of such important issues 
may affect the integrity of the court system. 
Despite these concerns, the drug courts’ methodologies have led 
 
personnel—is important to meeting the goals of both the criminal justice system and those of 
treatment providers.”). 
 91. See Boldt, supra note 48, at 1255. 
 92. See Alternatives to Incarceration, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1863, 1918 (1998) (describing 
the new role for these attorneys “[a]s part of the treatment ‘team,’ the defense attorney is 
supposed to act in accordance with his client’s best interests, even when those interests involve 
sanctions” and “[t]his change in perspective subverts the traditional role of defense counsel as 
zealous advocates for their clients’ legal rights, which requires counsel to argue in accordance 
with their clients’ wishes, not necessarily their best interests”). 
 93. See Boldt, supra note 48, at 1255. 
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to some measurable successes.94 But choosing to utilize these 
strategies in a wholly different setting may present greater problems. 
The next section examines the progression from the drug court model 
to community courts and the questions raised when drug court 
methodologies are imported into a different context. 
II. THE MOVEMENT FROM DRUG COURTS TO COMMUNITY COURTS 
Like their drug court counterparts, community courts developed in 
response to a concern that the criminal justice system did not 
sufficiently engage in practices designed to solve some of society’s 
recurring problems. The community court model recognized that the 
court’s coercive power could be used to force individuals into some 
form of treatment or to ensure that individuals engage in some type of 
“community restitution.”95 From the start, these courts assumed a 
decidedly political slant.96 They grew out of zero tolerance97 and 
quality-of-life policing tactics.98 They widened the jurisdictional net 
of criminal courts. The types of cases addressed in these new courts 
have come to include those “victimless” crimes once considered 
outside the jurisdiction of traditional criminal courts.99 What had 
once been minor infractions or low-level misdemeanors became the 
principal focus of this new judicial effort.100 
 
 94. See sources cited infra note 97. 
 95. Glenn M. Kaas, Restorative Justice: A New Paradigm for the Prosecutor (A View 
from Hartford Community Courts), PROSECUTOR, Dec. 2000, at 31, 33.  
 96. See sources cited infra note 97. 
 97. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of 
Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1168-69 (1996); 
Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of 
Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 291 (1998) (using empirical data to critique New York City’s quality-of-life 
initiative); Symposium, Why is Crime Decreasing?, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1173 
(1998); Fox Butterfield, Rethinking the Strong Arm of the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1999, § 4 
(Week in Review), at 1 (promoting community policing as an alternative to the zero tolerance 
approach taken in New York City).  
 98. John J. Ammann, Addressing Quality of Life Crimes in Our Cities: Criminalization, 
Community Courts and Community Compassion, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 811, 813 (2000).  
 99. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal 
Justice System, 105 YALE L. J. 677, 679 (1995).  
 100. See infra note 126. 
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A. Climbing In Through Broken Windows 
James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling posited a theory that gave 
rise to a new policing movement.101 The “broken window” 
philosophy suggested a need to focus law enforcement on minor 
infractions.102 The authors contended that a broken window left 
untended signaled a degree of neglect and apathy that inexorably led 
to more—and more severe—property damage.103 They argued that 
disorderly conditions and behaviors flow from such neglect.104 If no 
one addressed these problems, citizens’ fear would rise, as would the 
rate of serious crime, resulting in a “downward spiral of urban 
decay.”105 The authors pointed to a solution. They noted that 
whenever communities in the past seemed on the verge of losing 
control over crime, residents and authorities in neighborhoods moved 
to reassert their control over both the conduct of youth and other 
disorderly behavior.106 Minor offenses posed serious consequences 
for neighborhoods and communities because they inevitably led to 
greater lawlessness that communities could ill afford.107 
Anxious to test-drive his theories, Kelling worked with William 
Bratton, then chief of the Transit Police in New York City. They 
targeted the subway system as a prototype of an institution that 
seemed out of control in the 1980s and early 1990s.108 Using Broken 
Windows as a theoretical framework, Bratton sent “cleaning teams” 
 
 101. See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 13, at 29. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.   
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See George L. Kelling, Why Did People Stop Committing Crimes? An Essay About 
Criminology and Ideology, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 567, 575 (2000): 
By the late 1980s the subway environment was out of control. Despite the virtual 
elimination of graffiti by 1989, conditions were so bad that citizens were abandoning 
the subway in droves. A quarter of a million passengers a day didn’t bother to pay their 
fare; extortion of money from passengers via aggressive panhandling was the rule of 
the day; robberies were increasing; and things were worsening fast. The “official” New 
York Times spin on all this was that the problem was homelessness—an interpretation 
supported by homeless advocacy groups and the New York City Civil Liberties Union. 
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into the subways with high powered hoses and police escorts.109 
When workers hosing down the living areas of the homeless were 
challenged by homeless individuals, the police moved in and made 
arrests.110 The subways appeared cleaner, people felt safer, and the 
homeless were less visible.111 Crime rates decreased.112 This was 
hailed nationally as a major success in policing and “proof” of the 
validity of the Broken Windows theory.113 
New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani used the Broken 
Windows theory to declare war on low level offenses.114 This led to 
the design and implementation of an aggressive policing approach to 
quality-of-life offenses.115 Giuliani’s administration vigorously 
enforced laws against public drinking, public urination, illegal 
peddling, squeegee cleaning of car windshields by street-people, 
panhandling, prostitution, loitering, graffiti spraying, and turnstile 
jumping.116 According to Mayor Giuliani, aggressive enforcement of 
these laws was a necessary prerequisite to combating serious crime—
such as murders and robberies—because minor disorderly offenses 
can lead to serious crime.117 The city administration utilized a zero 
tolerance policy, directing police to make arrests for a wide range of 
offenses that were not previously viewed as custodial offenses.118  
The economic revitalization of urban centers fueled this effort. 
 
 109. George L. Kelling & William J. Bratton, Declining Crime Rates: Insiders’ View of the 
New York City Story, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1217, 1220-21 (1998).  
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. John Tierney, The Holy Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1995, § 6 (magazine), at 60 
(describing decline in crime rate and cleaner parks and subways under Giuliani and Bratton). 
 114. See ELI B. SILVERMAN, NYPD BATTLES CRIME: INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES IN 
POLICING 4, 78-80 (1999) (discussing the New York City Police Department’s “full-court 
press” on crime and Mayor Giuliani’s campaign against “quality of life” offenses). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.; see also William J. Bratton, The New York City Police Department’s Civil 
Enforcement of Quality-of-Life Crimes, 3 J.L. & POL’Y 447 (1995). 
 117. Rudolph W. Giuliani, The Next Phase of Quality of Life: Creating a More Civil City 
(Feb. 24, 1998), at http://www.nyc.gov/html/rwg/html/98a/quality.html (on file with author); 
see also William J. Bratton, New Strategies for Combating Crime in New York City, 23 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 781, 785-89 (1996); Rudolph W. Giuliani, An Agenda to Prepare for the 
Next Century: 1999 State of the City Address (Jan. 14, 1999), available at http://www.nyc.gov/ 
html/rwg/html/99a/stcity99.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2002).  
 118. Leena Kurki, Restorative and Community Justice in the United States, 27 CRIME & 
JUST. 235, 251 (2000).   
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However, instead of creating greater tolerance for the less fortunate, 
the economic prosperity resulted in calls for increased arrests of the 
homeless as a necessary step to maintaining vital and safe business 
environments.119 Given this enforcement strategy, massive numbers 
of individuals with misdemeanor charges entered the court system.120 
As these homeless individuals, who often suffered from mental 
impairments, moved into the courts, the court system began to 
redirect its focus.121  
1. Community Court Origins  
One of the problems that the Giuliani Administration faced once it 
shifted its focus to low-level crimes was that the criminal court 
continued to view these offenses less seriously. Typically, police 
officers failed to appear for trial presuming the case would be 
dismissed, plea bargained, or that the defendant would fail to appear, 
and the judge would dismiss the case.122 By vesting authority for such 
cases in community courts—and making this their sole focus—the 
judicial and political system opened the door for police to increase 
the number of citations and arrests for the low-level offenses.123 
The Nation’s first community court began in New York City.124 
The Center for Court Innovation (CCI) and the Chief Judge of the 
Court of Appeals, Judith Kaye, designed the new court to handle 
arraignments for pervasive misdemeanor crimes, such as prostitution, 
illegal vending, graffiti, shoplifting, and turnstile-jumping in the 
city’s subway system.125 Chief Judge Kaye made clear that the new 
court would focus on quality-of-life crimes and would implement the 
broken windows methodology.126 These problem-solving courts,127 as 
 
 119. See Jerome H. Skolnick & Abigail Caplovitz, Guns, Drugs and Profiling: Ways to 
Target Guns and Minimize Racial Profiling, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 413 (2001). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Ammann, supra note 98, at 815. 
 122. Id. at 817.  
 123. See Maria Foscarinis et al., Out of Sight, Out of Mind?: The Continuing Trend Toward 
the Criminalization of Homelessness, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 145, 154 (1999).  
 124. Denckla, supra note 3, at 1617. 
 125. See Julie Brienza, Community Courts Reach Out to Put a Dent in Petty Crime, TRIAL, 
Mar. 1999, at 14. 
 
 126. Judith S. Kaye, Changing Courts in Changing Times: The Need for a Fresh Look at 
How Courts Are Run, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 851, 858 (1997).  
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Kaye and CCI director John Feinblatt labeled them, would use the 
power and authority of the judiciary to change the behavior of 
litigants128 (usually meaning defendants). In one of many speeches 
lauding the court, Kaye explained that: 
[by] zeroing in on nonviolent quality of life offenses, the court 
is a working laboratory for ‘broken window’ theories of 
criminal behavior: the idea being that just as one broken 
window left unrepaired invites more vandalism, so other forms 
of social disorder left unchecked invite more crime. Above all, 
the Midtown Court is a collaborative effort, led by the courts, 
to move theory into practice.129  
2. Design and Management of Community Courts  
Given the broad mandate of problem-solving courts, they 
unsurprisingly address a wide range of issues.130 Problem solving 
courts provide extensive supervision and treatment for specifically 
identified minor crimes.131 In the process, these courts forge new 
responses to difficult problems, including domestic violence, 
quality-of-life crimes, child neglect, and mental illness.132  
Community courts differ from their traditional counterparts in 
several significant ways.133 Some of the courts focus on specific types 
 
 127. John Feinblatt, architect of the Midtown Community Court and the Center for Court 
Innovation, coined this term for Court Innovation in New York. See generally Judith S. Kaye, 
Making the Case for Hands-On Courts, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 11, 1999, at 13 (arguing in favor of 
community courts and their potential). The Midtown Community Court was developed by the 
Center for Court Innovation, a public/private partnership that works to develop innovative court 
programs. See Center for Court Innovation, at http://www.communityjustice.org/resources/ 
homecci.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2002). For further explanation of the plan of the Midtown 
Community Court, see Midtown Community Court, at http://www.courtinnovation.org/ 
demo_01mcc.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2002).  
 128. Denckla, supra note 3, at 1614. 
 129. Kaye, supra note 126, at 858. 
 130. See Knipps & Berman, supra note 3. 
 131. Id. at 8-9. 
 132. Feinblatt et al., supra note 2, at 282. 
 
 133. “Problem solving justice” is a term that describes judicial efforts to use the authority 
of courts not just to resolve the legal questions presented in a case, but also to address the 
deeper social issues that may underlie a significant portion of the caseload. Other examples of 
problem solving courts include Criminal Drug Treatment Courts, Family Treatment Courts, and 
Community Courts. See Kaye, supra note 126, at 855-62 (describing New York’s Midtown 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol10/iss1/5
p 63 Thompson book pages.doc  12/18/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002]  Courting Disorder 87 
 
of crimes, such as domestic violence, graffiti, and prostitution.134 
Other courts take cases from specific catchment areas.135 The latter 
courts handle all minor cases that occur within a particular 
geographical zone. 
Procedural differences abound as well. Most jurisdictions do not 
allow trials to take place in the community court. Instead, they follow 
a post-disposition model. In order to gain access to the wide range of 
services available, defendants usually must plead guilty.136 The 
treatment provided by community courts offers a number of 
incentives for participation. For the defendant, it limits the court’s 
punishment options to some form of community service.137 For the 
victims, it generally reduces the number of court appearances. For the 
prosecution and defense, it permits the quick resolution of cases that 
would otherwise add to already staggering caseloads. For the system 
itself, it is a way to mete out justice quickly and in a relatively 
inexpensive fashion. 
Community courts adopted many of the processes employed by 
drug courts. For example, community courts expect the judge to 
assume a more active, managerial role.138 The judge becomes an 
active case manager, creative administrator and team leader.139 She 
fosters communication among all participants, remains sensitive to 
community concerns and oversees the defendant’s participation in 
various programs.140 Also, as in drug courts, the community court 
model utilizes a non-adversarial approach.141 Drawing on the rhetoric 
 
Community Court and Family Treatment Courts); Rottman & Casey, supra note 15, at 13.  
 134. Kaye, Rethinking, supra note 3, at 1494.  
 135. See Midtown Community Court, supra note 127.  
 136. The judge extracts from most what we have termed a “conditional plea of guilty” with 
the understanding that such plea will be withdrawn and the case dismissed upon the completion 
of community service. Very few defendants in the Hartford Community Court elect a trial. 
Also, very few defendants feel the need for representation. (A public defender is available for 
those who qualify and apply.) See Kaas, supra note 95, at 31. 
 137. Note that the punishment is limited to community service as opposed to the potential 
of incarceration (at least initially). 
 138. See Kaas, supra note 95, at 31; see also Calabrese, supra note 3, at 16. 
 139. See, e.g., Greg Berman, What is a Traditional Judge Anyway?, 84 JUDICATURE 78, 81 
(2000). 
 140. Id. 
 141. See Kaas, supra note 95, at 35; see also Judith S. Kaye, Lawyering for a New Age, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 11 (1998) (“Our less adversarial problem solving courts cast both judges 
and attorneys in new roles—what impact will that have on ethical rules premised on an 
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of the drug courts, architects of the problem-solving courts suggest 
that the “type” of crimes that these courts focus on are not conducive 
to adversarial contests.142  
Although community courts may attempt to emulate the drug 
court movement, there are fundamental differences between the 
models. Although drug courts came into existence as a reaction 
against the perceived mishandling of drug cases in criminal courts, 
they at least had a body of experience on which to draw. Everyone 
who had participated in the criminal court model had some sense of 
what did and did not work. They could identify experiences with 
experts in various aspects of drug use and drug culture. Moving to a 
different framework may have increased the court’s reliance on these 
experts and professionals, but it did not require creating an entirely 
new structure of programs and treatment regimes. 
Community courts do not have the same luxury. They typically 
address matters that have no long-term track record of treatment and 
no experts,143 such as problems facing specific geographic areas and 
quality-of-life crimes like graffiti and prostitution. While these 
offenses may be related to well-studied problems such as gang 
affiliation, unemployment, and even drug dependency, there is far 
less data than in the drug crime context for formulating approaches to 
addressing them. 
3. What Community Do Community Courts Serve? 
As indicated, declining confidence in the criminal justice system 
coupled with increasing fear of crime—even as crime rates across the 
country fell144—seems to have propelled the movement toward 
 
adversarial model? If a client’s insistence on efficient resolution conflicts with a lawyer’s 
notion of professional representation.”).  
 142. See Paul Michael Hassett, Expanding the Role of the Courts, N.Y. ST. B.A.J., Apr. 
2001, at J5-6. Family courts struggle with their own recidivistic problem—the victim of 
domestic violence who obtains an order of protection which is often ineffective in resolving the 
underlying conflict. Family violence and drug addiction have forced the entire system of foster 
care and child custody into the family court arena but the adversarial process is not readily 
conducive to the solution of these problems. In fact, they are not easily resolvable at all when 
the best interests of the child provides no objective or bright-line standard of resolution. 
 143. There is no real history of a treatment regime to address crimes associated with 
poverty, like turn-style jumping and panhandling.  
 
 144. See Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 74, at 129.  
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community courts. Advocates of the community court model have 
hailed them as an answer to a community’s feelings of separation 
from the justice system. However, it is worth noting that businesses 
have often been the driving force behind the design and establishment 
of these courts.145 Community courts are rarely focused on the 
interests of low-income communities.  
The Manhattan Midtown Community Court is an example of this 
phenomenon. It was reportedly established to address community 
problems in midtown New York City, particularly in Times 
Square.146 Times Square was in transition. While it remained a 
popular tourist attraction due to its many restaurants and theaters, 
parts of it were dominated by X-rated theaters and small hotels that 
facilitated prostitution. In response, the Giuliani administration 
pushed to clean up the area and reclaim it for business and tourism.147 
Against this backdrop, the idea for the Manhattan Midtown 
Community Court developed.148 
The Times Square Business Community acted as the court’s 
principal sponsor.149 The court received funding from the Schubert 
Foundation, The New York Times Co. Foundation, the Times Square 
Business Improvement District, and other businesses.150 Funding 
appeared to come from the business community for the business 
community, raising fundamental questions about the altruistic 
rhetoric behind the court’s establishment.151 Criticism about the 
source of the court’s funding emerged from a number of quarters, 
including the office of the District Attorney for New York County.152 
Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau remarked: “[I]t 
bothers me that people who can put up money and have influence can 
 
 145. See Ammann, supra note 98. 
 146. See Jan Hoffman, A User-Friendly Experiment in Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1993, 
at B1. For a detailed study of the Midtown Community Court, see MICHELE SVIRIDOFF ET AL., 
DISPENSING JUSTICE LOCALLY, THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS OF THE MIDTOWN 
COMMUNITY COURT 1-5 (1997). 
 147. See Goldkamp, supra note 47. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Ammann, supra note 98, at 816. 
 150. Brienza, supra note 125, at 14. 
 151. See Kurki, supra note 118, at 290.  
 152. See Brienza, supra note 125, at 14. 
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get their own court.”153 Despite these concerns, the Manhattan 
Midtown Community Court opened its doors in 1993.154 The 
principal focus, as one might expect, was to rid the area of the sorts 
of offenses and offenders that interfered with business and tourism. 
Atlanta followed New York’s lead. Desperately looking for a way 
to attract visitors back to the downtown area, Atlanta officials 
announced the formation of a community court.155 The creators of the 
court relied almost exclusively on the business community for 
support.156 Atlanta’s city leaders viewed the court as a tool for 
making downtown more attractive to visitors and workers.157 But, as 
in other cities, the plan’s implementation ran into significant delay.158 
Atlanta Mayor Bill Campbell announced the creation of a community 
court in 1998, but it took another two years for any funds to be 
appropriated.159 
Aside from the business interests of the financial sector, many 
who promote community courts hope to use them to address the 
problem of increasing homelessness in our communities.160 To justify 
using courts for this purpose, proponents articulate a policy of 
“compassionate justice.” By providing a wide range of services, they 
claim to offer well-meaning intervention.161 Significantly, however, 
this approach ignores the structural and systemic causes of 
homelessness. Focusing on the individual and utilizing the coercive 
power of the criminal justice system to push that individual to get 
some form of assistance for specific problems can have only a limited 
effect in eradicating homelessness. 
But what if a community court actually wanted to serve the 
interests of the entire community including the interests of the poor 
and disenfranchised? What would be necessary to make community 
courts more responsive to the diverse needs of a community, 
 
 153. Id. at 14. 
 154. See Denckla, supra note 3, at 1617. 
 155. See Ammann, supra note 98, at 815. 
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. at 817. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 816. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See Denckla, supra note 3, at 1616. 
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including the interests of these marginalized groups? At a minimum, 
courts would need to think broadly and creatively about including 
diverse community perspectives. Instead of a single mode of contact 
with the community in which it functions, courts might use multiple 
interactions, such as on-going focus groups,162 advisory boards, and 
peer courts.163 By opening up the initial discussion of the court’s 
purpose and jurisdiction and continuing an open dialogue, the court 
will have a better chance of embracing the goals of the community 
and not merely of the court’s architects. Communities might thereby 
gain community-oriented courts, not just a court located in the 
community. 
Another critical component of any successful community court 
effort is coordination with local law enforcement. This could coincide 
with authentic community policing efforts as opposed to mere 
traditional policing based in neighborhoods. True community 
policing requires attention to and integration of community desires as 
a central part of the enforcement effort. 
In practice, communities typically have little involvement in 
making the decision to establish community courts. This oversight 
can limit the courts’ effectiveness. While lawyers, judges and court 
administrators often favor new courts, residents might conclude that 
courts are not the mechanism of choice to address their problems. 
Community members may view the root causes of many of the 
perpetual problems in low-income areas and communities of color as 
far too nuanced to be addressed by means of court adjudication. In 
addition, court-based proceedings may alienate some members of the 
community who are unaccustomed to court proceedings. In 
traditional courts, the “providers” of legal services look much 
different than the “consumers” of those services. This brings with it a 
panoply of unique cultural problems in attempting to fashion services 
around life experiences. Finally, community residents may prefer to 
resolve issues without the threat of the criminal justice system 
 
 162. This is contrasted from those courts that have one-time focus groups or surveys that 
only happen as the courts are being set up.  
 163. David B. Wexler, Symposium, Just Some Thinking About Delinquent Behavior: A 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approach to Relapse Prevention Planning and Youth Advisory 
Juries, 69 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 93, 105 (2000).  
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hanging in the balance. In the absence of other alternatives, some 
embrace the notion of community courts because these courts bring 
with them a wide range of services. Given the choice, however, 
communities may prefer to access the services without the court 
structure. 
III. THE FUTURE OF COMMUNITY COURTS 
A. The Need for More Empirical Data 
Some observers of community courts recognize a need for 
additional research and acquisition of empirical data to determine the 
ultimate effectiveness of community courts.164 Information showing 
positive change in defendants who pass through community courts, as 
well as long-term recidivism data similar to that available for drug 
courts would lend credence to the pronouncements of community 
court successes. In addition, this type of information would 
contribute to the development of a specific training curriculum for 
judges and lawyers who participate in these courts. 
B. The Need for Clear Role Definition 
A key area for further research is how community courts should 
define the roles of the various participants. Simply borrowing 
definitions from other settings is inappropriate. Community courts 
have a unique mission, which may require unique role definitions. 
But without adequate justification for an abandonment of traditional 
roles community courts will never move beyond experimentation. 
Such unguided experimentation can damage the court and interfere 
with its goals. 
Given the broad mandate of community courts, the judge’s role 
seems even less certain than in drug courts. One judge described the 
functions as “different” from other judging, due to the expanded 
responsibilities.165 Because the judge must actively work to solve the 
 
 164. Goldkamp, supra note 22, at 958.  
 165. Discussion Roundtable of Problem Solving Courts, 66-67 (Mar. 8, 2002) (unpublished 
paper on file with author) [hereinafter Discussion Roundtable].  
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problem that gave rise to the case, her role departs significantly from 
the traditional arbiter’s role. Of course, drug courts furnish some 
precedent for greater involvement of judges in directing and 
overseeing a defendant’s treatment. Still, the responsibility to involve 
the community in the court’s decision making places new demands—
and expectations—on the judge. 
Community court judges must broaden their knowledge base 
beyond an understanding of the law and the legal framework within 
which cases will be decided. They must read more broadly and across 
disciplines to develop a better foundation from which to formulate 
methods to address recurring problems.166 They may need to develop 
partnerships with the academic community to stay abreast of 
psychological, sociological, and economic theories that inform and 
facilitate assessment of behavior and identification of viable methods 
of addressing problems. This raises two difficult questions. First, are 
we expecting too much of judges if we charge them with resolving 
complex social problems through the criminal justice system? 
Second, if judges must engage in specialized problem solving, what 
training best prepares them to perform these tasks?  
Judges’ expanded duties also raise real concern about the 
appearance and influence of bias. As community court judges 
participate in community meetings, they are subject to influence by 
various constituencies. Some judges have raised concerns about the 
potential for making decisions based in part on community sentiment, 
something the judicial oath prohibits.167 Indeed, the U.S. Justice 
Department monograph on the subject of community involvement 
seems to recommend somewhat limited interactions: 
All but two courts created a community advisory panel during 
the planning period, and most of the projects held community 
meetings to determine priorities for the new court. Five 
projects held focus group discussions to better understand 
community member’s concerns and recommendations.168 
 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 119 (Judge Morrison’s comments).  
 168. ERIC LEE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMUNITY COURTS: AN EVOLVING MODEL 7 
(2000).  
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If community courts are going to exist, perhaps the tension 
between impartiality and active involvement in cases is a tension with 
which we must live. However, certain minimal safeguards seem in 
order. First, the courts should limit judicial involvement in 
community meetings to those in which both the government and 
public defender are present, or where minutes are provided to all 
relevant parties. This safeguard is analogous to ex parte 
communications in traditional court proceedings, and would protect 
judges from allegations of improperly acting on behalf of 
constituencies. Courts might also require judges to consult with other 
members of the judiciary before making a final decision in cases 
involving community interests. By obtaining opinions from 
colleagues who have not been in contact with the community groups 
who are involved in the case, the judge can ensure that she is not 
improperly influenced by special interests in the community. Finally, 
judges should be required to make full disclosure to all parties about 
attendance at community meetings, and in no circumstances should 
judges have ex parte communications with either side regarding 
information acquired at any meeting. While the intermingling of 
judges and community groups produces both benefits and burdens 
that need to be more fully explored, these suggested safeguards 
would help foster the judicial impartiality that community courts 
need. 
Public defenders encounter their own challenges in the court 
setting. Although a defender may recognize that her clients are often 
in need of a wide range of services, it is unclear whether the criminal 
justice system offers the best vehicle to intervene in their lives. 
Indeed, individuals would likely take advantage of these services on 
their own if they were packaged as comprehensively as they are in 
community courts.169 The defender therefore becomes an active 
participant in—and perhaps reluctant proponent of—a process that 
links social services to the criminal justice system. The promise of 
treatment carries with it the threat of incarceration or other penalties.  
In March 2000, the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice 
Programs, the Open Society Institute, and the Center for Court 
 
 169. See Calabrese, supra note 3, at 16.  
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Innovation sponsored a roundtable discussion focusing on the roles of 
prosecutors and defenders in “problem-solving” courts like 
community courts.170 In contrasting defense attorneys in community 
courts with those in drug courts, one of the participants suggested that 
the choice of whether to proceed in drug treatment might be easy for 
a defendant.171 This is because drug court defenders often seek a 
disposition that involves drug treatment in lieu of custody.172 The 
informality of the process, at least initially, does not offend the notion 
of zealous advocacy.173 When the forum is a community court, 
however, the treatment, instead of being an attractive option to 
incarceration, is often coerced.174  
In addition, when the judge has moved from impartial arbiter to an 
active participant and, as in a large number of these courts, works 
closely with drug treatment personnel, the quality of the proceedings 
is highly questionable. Defenders are forced into the role of 
negotiator rather than advocate.175 Consequently, defenders and 
prosecutors become more dependent upon the work of other social 
service professionals.176 This raises fundamental questions about 
using the criminal justice system to coerce service for crimes such as 
sleeping in public, sneaking onto the subway, or applying graffiti. 
These offenses seem to be related to economic status and 
employability. The appropriateness of using the criminal courts rather 
than simply providing job training accessibility and more 
comprehensive housing is questionable. The status offenses are 
different than drug offenses. Drug offenses have a history of success 
with treatment, while the crimes addressed by community courts do 
not. Defenders placed in the position of having to make rapid 
decisions about direct and collateral consequences of guilty pleas to 
access social services for their clients must balance the need for 
 
 170. John Feinblatt & Derek Denckla, What Does It Mean to be a Good Lawyer: 
Prosecutors, Defenders, and Problem-Solving Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 206, 206 (2001).  
 171. Id. at 210 (comments of Hon. Judy Harris Kluger and Kim Taylor-Thompson). 
 172. Id. 
 173. See Boldt, supra note 48, at 1254-55. 
 174. Id. at 211 (comments of Robert Weisberg and Jo-Ann Wallace). 
 175. See Feinblatt & Denckla, supra note 170, at 212 (referring to Cait Clarke’s 
comments). 
 176. Id. (referring to Elizabeth Glazer’s comments). 
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further investigation against the availability of the offer.  
Some of the new tensions that defenders confront in these 
community courts can be addressed during the design phase if 
defenders are brought to the table early in the process and are vigilant 
to the myriad of potential problems. Additionally, many of the types 
of offenses that are addressed in these courts do not require a guilty 
plea for therapeutic purposes, as is often regarded as necessary in the 
drug court context.177 
If all defendants plead guilty in the court, few will question the 
charges brought against them. When defenders are not structurally 
necessary for the court to operate, they become nothing more than 
ornamental. In some of these community courts, the problems are 
resolved without the participation of defense counsel.178 
Prosecutors in community courts are, by design, less 
adversarial.179 They focus on addressing community concerns about a 
previously identified community problem.180 Some community court 
prosecutors view their role as collaborating with the offender in 
bringing about “community restitution” for the nuisance caused.181 
The important issues are where and how a prosecutor should obtain 
input on what community concerns to pursue in this type of tribunal. 
 
 177. See Terence T. Gorski & John M. Kelly, Counselor’s Manual for Relapse Prevention 
with Chemically Dependent Criminal Offenders 5-9, Dep’t of Health & Human Services, Pub. 
No. 96-3115 (1996); see also Vickie Kropenska et al., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 
Protecting Children in Substance-Abusing Families Dep’t of Health & Human Services, at 19 
(1994); Nat’l Inst. on Drug Abuse, Principles of Drug Addiction, NIH Pub. No. 00-4180, at 14-
15 (October 1999, reprinted July 2000); Kevin B. Sherin & Barry Mahoney, Treatment Drug 
Courts: Integrating Substance Abuse Treatment with Legal Case Processing Dep’t of Health & 
Human Services, Pub. No. 96-3113, at 8-9 (1996); Joel Haycock, Speaking Truth to Power: 
Rights, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and Massachusetts Mental Health Law, 20 NEW ENG. J. 
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 301, 304, 315 (1994) (cautioning that the focus on the concept of 
therapeutic jurisprudence in criminal cases carries the risk that individual civil rights will be 
ignored in favor of therapeutic concerns); Andrew J. Kleinfeld, The Sentencing Guidelines 
Promote Truth and Justice, 55 FED. PROBATION 16, 18 (1991) (“The value to society . . . of a 
guilty plea is much less than its value to actors within the justice system.”); Beth A. Townsend, 
Defending the “Indefensible”: A Primer to Defending Allegations of Child Abuse, 45 A.F. L. 
REV. 261, 269 (1998); David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and 
Criminal Justice Mental Health Issues, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 225, 229-
30 (1992).   
 178. Kaas, supra note 95, at 34. 
 179. Goldkamp, supra note 22, at 950; Kaas, supra note 95, at 32.  
 180. Kaas, supra note 95, at 32. 
 181. Id.  
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol10/iss1/5
p 63 Thompson book pages.doc  12/18/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002]  Courting Disorder 97 
 
These issues are of particular concern when the primary source of 
community intelligence comes from police officers. Working the 
same beats often lead officers to develop biases about specific types 
of crimes or even worse, about particular neighborhood 
individuals.182  
Another potential impediment for prosecutors stems from the 
training and culture that exists in many prosecutors’ offices.183 
Community court prosecutors who work in offices that glorify trial 
victories will need some form of training regimen suitable for their 
different tour of duty. 
Finally, the coercive atmosphere of the court must be addressed. 
In the Hartford Community Court, the judge accepts a defendant’s 
“conditional plea of guilty” with the understanding that the plea will 
be withdrawn and the case dismissed upon the completion of 
community service.184 As a result, very few defendants go to trial.185 
This may suggest to defendants that there is little need for 
representation.186 If defense counsel is deemed unnecessary, then the 
court and the government will be represented in the process, but 
defendants will decide for themselves whether they should request 
counsel or rely on the benevolence of the prosecutor and judge in 
making the same type of assessment.  
With all of the energy that has gone into community courts’ 
architectural design, social service agency participation, and resource 
allocation, very little has been done to address training for the 
participants’ new roles or what it means to implement such 
proceedings. As a result, the proceedings could devolve into an 
unrecognizable caricature of a courtroom, in which judges are 
anything but impartial, defense lawyers are virtually invisible, 
prosecutors are making most of the decisions about who may or may 
 
 182. See generally Anthony Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth 
Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956 (1999); see also Russell Eisenman, Is there Bias in U.S. 
Law Enforcement?, 20 J. SOC. POL. & ECON. STUD. 229 (1995). 
 183. See Feinblatt & Denckla, supra note 170, at 209 (referring to Elizabeth Glazer’s 
comments). 
 184. Kass, supra note 95, at 34. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
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not participate in the diversionary program, and service providers are 
the primary information source. 
C. How Do We Know What Works: Evaluating Success 
The true story of the success and failures of the community court 
movement has yet to be written. A dispassionate approach with fair 
and sober empirical and anecdotal evidence will be the prelude to 
such a work. Success will need to be measured from a number of 
different, and perhaps competing, vantage points. The goal of 
providing adequate time to counsel clients about their options187 may 
conflict with the pressure to move cases quickly so that a larger 
volume of defendants can be seen each day. The location of courts is 
an additional issue. If the goal of the community court movement is 
to serve in communities which traditionally have not been served 
well by the criminal justice system, then services, from transportation 
to drug treatment resources, must be available in those communities 
as well.188  
In addition to these unresolved issues about the structure of 
community courts, there is also a fundamental question about court 
culture. The courts, like drug courts, subordinate other issues of law 
to rehabilitation and treatment. The result risks individuals being 
denied the opportunity to challenge the conduct of law enforcement 
in the interaction with a defendant that leads to the community court 
referral. Given that most of the crimes addressed in community 
courts are quality-of-life or zero tolerance offenses, they may give 
rise to Fourth Amendment issues. Consequently, as we examine these 
community courts and their effectiveness, we should be sensitive to 
the impact of encouraging guilty pleas as a vehicle for gaining access 
to the resources of the court. 
 
 187. See Feinblatt & Denckla, supra note 170, at 213 (referring to Michele Maxian’s 
comments).  
 188. Id. at 214 (referring to Anthony Thompson’s comments). 
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CONCLUSION 
Is the judicial branch the solution to some of our nation’s most 
difficult problems? Critiques of community courts suggest that the 
mission of these courts is outside the jurisdiction of the judicial 
branch and lies elsewhere.189 Achieving the community courts’ goals 
requires a collaborative effort, inclusive of the community, criminal 
justice officials, and political entities. In the end, we may recognize 
that the newly created approaches and new perspectives should apply 
to traditional criminal courts rather than new institutions.190 A more 
informed use of services, discretionary dismissal of some cases, and 
expanded provision of services to those in need may be the best 
solution to the shortcomings of the traditional criminal justice system. 
 
 189. Discussion Roundtable, supra note 165, at 82 (referring to comments of Judge 
Morrison).  
 190. See id. at 98 (comments of Judge Blatz) (“I would argue, to look at the traditional 
courts—I would argue that the good judge in a problem-solving court was the good judge in the 
old court. The only difference is the system did not support the old judge. It was fragmented, it 
was not systematic.”). 
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